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Legal Norms’ Distinctiveness in Legal Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism 
By Toby S Goldbach* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSFERS AND CLASHES 
 “Law is on the move.”1 States transplant foreign rules or procedures to improve 
commercial activity or as part efforts to harmonize political and legal systems.
2
 Foreign laws are 
also used as instruments in development projects, where increasingly these projects emphasize 
legal norms such as transparency or accountability as ends in themselves.
3
 This is the case in 
projects that promote the Rule of Law or democratic freedom as the key to progress
4
 but also 
with the rise of constitutionalism as an organizing concept or archetype in legal thought.
5
 Yet 
scholars have historically described deep connections between legal institutions and national 
                                                 
* JSD Candidate, Cornell University. Much of the thinking in this paper follows on research and ensuing 
conversations with Peter Katzenstein and Benjamin Brake and I am grateful to them for their insights and ideas. Any 
errors are solely my own. Thank you to Odette Lienau and Mariana Mota Prado for helpful comments and 
suggestions on this early draft.  
1
 John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law 
and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977) 
2
 See generally THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HARMONIZATION (Mads Andenas and Camilla Baasch Andersen, eds. 
2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 457 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg, eds. 2006). 
3
 Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock & Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law 
Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (2011); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF 
PROGRESS (2008);  
4
 Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004); David Kennedy, 
The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
5
 Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000 in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4;   sar Rodr  ue -Garavit, Toward a sociology of the global rule of law field: 
neoliberalism, neoconstitutionalisms, and the contest over judicial reform in Latin America, in LAWYERS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth eds., 2011); and Alvaro Santos, The 
World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3. 
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identities,
6
 or between legal culture and state history.
7
 National identities are thought to be 
reflected in how states administer justice – in their courts and justice procedures.8  The 
transnational movement of legal norms is thus “a subject of profound political importance and 
controversy.”9 
This paper examines the transnational movement of law and legal pluralism in the 
transnational domain in order to play with a specific question: whether legal norms are 
distinctive or whether there is a distinctive way that legal norms operate in practice. It engages 
with the International and considers two empirical domains or sets of disciplines: Legal 
Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism. Both reflect on the relationships between multiple 
overlappin  le al orders, and between “donors” and “recipients” in interactional legal practices. 
These disciplines point to moments of problem-articulation, periods of translation, and practices 
of acceptance and recognition. The paper suggests preliminary conclusions about the 
distinctiveness of legal norms, specifically that there is an aesthetic to law reform or legal 
instrumentalism and to a practice of recognition between overlapping normative options, both of 
which generate a particular kind of fidelity to law and legal norms. 
The paper is an initial attempt to work through three broad themes that will ground a larger 
project. The first is to bridge international and domestic domains as sites of interaction by 
focusing on the transnational movement of law and legal transplants. Cotterrell aptly writes:  
To invoke an idea of transnational law is to suggest that law has new sources, locations, and 
bases of authority. Addin  “transnational” to “law” is like addin  a question mark: 
queryin  modern Western jurisprudence’s state-centered understanding of law. It is also to 
query whether ideas and methods in international law need revising, to accelerate the 
ongoing development of this field away from its traditional focus on the relations of states, 
toward a broad concern with the regulatory problems of international society.
10
 
 
                                                 
6
 Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A  omparative Approach to the Legal Process (1991); 
Laura Nader, The ethnography of law (1965). 
7
 James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000). 
8
 Neil Vidmar & Valerie Hans, American Juries: the Verdict (2007); Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System: Report of the National Round Table on Aboriginal Justice Issues (1993). 
9
 Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Transnational Spread of American Law, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting 
Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901131 
10
 Cotterrell (2012), at 502-503. 
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Scholars, especially International Relations (“IR”) scholars have identified structures of 
global governance beyond domestic legal institutions and the legalizing of international 
institutions as relevant objects of study when engaging with the topic of law in the international 
domain.
11
 In these and other research projects there is often a separation between domestic 
(municipal) and International Law (“IL”), which is conceptually neat but unrealistic in the legal 
world. For example, Private International Law, which encompasses commercial disputes that 
cross national boundaries, is addressed in international dispute resolution institutions such as the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (e.g. US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp, 1998). 
However, important cases with international implications are still being decided in domestic 
courts (Filanto Spa v Chilewich International, 1992; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 2013). This 
paper follows other efforts to bridge the domestic and international in thinkin  about law’s 
relevancy.
12
 Here there are opportunities to examine the various ways that law interacts with and 
impacts on the international, for example in “transnational communal networks,”13 global legal 
pluralist orders
14
 and transnational legal orders.
15
  
One of the main concerns for IR scholars is why states comply with IL when there is no 
supra-national enforcement mechanism. As a legal domain where obligation and enforcement is 
uncertain, IL provides an opportunity to think about whether and how law exerts a “compliance 
                                                 
11
 GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, eds. 
2003); Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, & Duncan Snidal, The 
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000); JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 
(2001).  
12
 Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738, 742 (Jan Smits ed., 
2006). 
13
 Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500 (2012). 
14
 Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009); Ralf Michaels, Global 
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1155 (2007). 
15
 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229-230 (2012); 
Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (May 2012) (unpublished paper, presented at the 
International Conference on Law and Society, Hawaii, June 8, 2012, on file with author) (arguing that industry 
invention, transformations in national economies, or even changes in leadership of international organizations are all 
factors in the transformation of transnational legal orders) and see generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING 
AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory C. Shaffer, ed. 2013). 
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pull.”16 In other words, the way law “function(s) in a horizontal normative order such as 
international society”17 provides clues as to the distinctiveness of legal norms. Similarly, legal 
transplants and global legal pluralism, as sites of multiplicity and hybridity in law, are also 
examples of contingent compliance or obligation to legal systems. Legal transplants and pluralist 
legal orders are sites of clashes, indeterminacy, multiple overlapping claims to legitimacy, and 
places were norms are sources of “resistance, contestation and adaptation.”18 Here legal norms 
are “in jeapordy”, not in the sense that there is concern about whether or not legal norms can be 
enforced.
19
 Instead, contingency is implicated in fragmentation of legal regimes and multiple 
overlappin  sometimes contradictin  choices for le al rules and institutions. “Juristic 
innovation” in interpretin  and mana in  le al complexity20 will have something to say about 
whether there is anything particular about legal work and how legal norms are distinctive.  
The second broad theme is to begin to see judges as an object of study not in their capacity 
as decision makers but as part of an epistemic community
21
 that is involved in developing and 
institutionalizing new court procedures or methods for dispute processing. Examples of the ways 
that judges are involved in court reforms include the use of new “problem-solvin  courts”22 or 
“therapeutic jud in ,”23 (e.g. domestic violence courts, conciliation family courts), or judicial 
involvement in promoting lay participation in criminal trials.
24
 This theme takes as its starting 
point the phenomenon of legal pluralism or fragmentation of law generally, and of courts and 
court procedures more specifically.
25
 Under this view, what happens at court is no longer typified 
                                                 
16
 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012) 
17 Jutta Brunn e & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 9 
(2010). 
18
 Berman (2009), at 230-231. 
19
 Cotterrell (2012), at 516. 
20
 Cotterrell (2012), at 504.  
21
 Haas 
22
 See e.g. Greg Berman, Greg, John Feinblatt, & Sarah Glazer, Good Courts: The Case for Problem-Solving Justice, 
(2005). 
23
 See e.g. Bruce J Winick & David B. Wexler, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Courts (2003). 
24
 See infra section 
25
 Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (2006) 
 -5- 
 
by a single type of procedure and specialized courts with different types of judicial functions 
now feature in multiple jurisdictions.
26
 
The paper intermittently relies on examples of judges involved in the international domain. 
These examples highlight the legal and political implications of judicial activities that are not 
decision-making per se. There are numerous sites where jud es en a e in or are ‘active’ in 
shaping law. For example, the domestic judiciary acting as a major branch of government 
currently features as the foundational thinking in Law and Development programs.
27
 The World 
Bank’s website announces that Justice Systems Matter for Development. “Justice institutions are 
important in determining the extent to which these societal expectations are reali ed…” They 
have “specific instrumental roles” in “fosterin  private sector  rowth” and in “ensurin  
compliance of private sector actors and citi ens with le al and re ulatory frameworks.”28 
Moreover, paradoxical visions of judges domestically and internationally point to a fundamental 
underlying self-doubt about law that is currently circulating in scholarship and the legal 
community. Judges and courts are thus sites of investigation in a project about whether legal 
norms are distinctive because they embody concerns about law as a tool for social change.
29
 
The third move is to shift the focus in thinking about distinctiveness of legal norms away 
from definitional perspectives to practice or interactional explanations. This is analogous to 
Robert Borofsky’s recommendation to focus on social performance rather than merely on 
intellectual content in understanding knowledge.
30
 Borofsky argues that to focus on content at 
the expense of social performance neglects important aspects of what people know. Similarly, 
                                                 
26
 Mitchel de S -O -L'E Lasser, Judicial Transformations: The Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe (2009) 
27
 Bryant G Garth, Law and society as law and development, 37 LAW SOC. REV. 37:305, 306 (comparing the present 
focus with past Law and Development programs which focused on lawyers, legal education and corporate law 
systems); Duncan Kennedy (2006), supra. 
28
 The World Bank has spent more than $850 million on funded projects “dedicated specifically to assistin  
developin  countries in establishin  efficient and effective justice systems “ in particular “focused primarily on 
improvin  the performance of courts”. 
29
 On doubting the Law and Society movement, Robert Din wall concludes that “The result of thirty years mainly 
doing empirical work on topics of policy or public relevance is a view that none of it really matters very much. At 
best, scholars are conceptive ideolo ists… Research is normally a le itimation for what decisionmakers have 
already decided to do.” Robert Din wall, A Stranger at the Table: Reflections on Law, Society, and the Higgs Boson 
36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 29 (2002). 
30
 Robert Borofsky, On the Knowledge and Knowing of Cultural Activities, in ASSESSING CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY (Robert Borofsky ed., 1994). 
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the paper takes a kind of anthropological turn to an IR conversation – that of the distinctiveness 
of legal norms.  
The paper proceeds in three sections. The next section briefly reviews scholarship on legal 
norms in the international domain in order to set the stage for moving to the transnational and 
transactional to look for legal norms’ distinctiveness. The third and fourth sections look at 
relational accounts in legal transplants and global legal pluralism respectively. These sections 
build on an understanding of a practice of legality and collaborative norm-making and try to 
identify the types or modes of collaborative norm-making as they manifest in competitive and 
contingent legal spaces. The paper concludes with tentative claims about the distinctiveness of 
legal norms. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN 
A. Legal Norms and Obligation 
Two related questions or concerns often trouble legal scholars interested in the international 
domain. First, is the broad jurisprudential question: if the definition of law is rules given by the 
sovereign to persons under its command,
31
 then is “law between nations” really law and part of a 
legal system, or is it merely an honor system of guided morality?
32
 With the proliferation of 
international treaties, legalized international organizations, this question has lost potency and 
consequently receives less attention than the second more functional question. The second 
perennial question subsists: what motivates states to abide by legal commitments? How does law 
create obligation and bind states in the absence of a centralized overarching authoritative body 
that can enforce it?
33
 In other words, is there a particular way that law generates internalized 
                                                 
31
 Austin, Hart, Kelsen 
32
 Jack Goldsmith, & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1822 (2009); Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International 
Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451 (2009-2010) (“There is an intuition that international law is not actually law 
at all, that though it goes by the name of "law" it is in fact closer to politics, or moral exhortation, or aspiration, or 
pretense.”) 
33
 Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379 (1999) 
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compliance or obedience?
34
 It is within this second set of questions where legal scholar engage 
in interesting ways with questions about how law works or whether legal norms are distinctive. 
International legal scholars address functional, causal curiosities to find the source of what 
motivates and precipitates compliance with IL.
35
 Several scholars provide detailed accounts of 
IR theory and the impact of legal commitments in guiding state behavior
36
 and this does not need 
to be reviewed here. It will suffice to say that at a most general and superficial level, IR Realists 
who believe that power and the distribution of material capabilities instructs states in an anarchic 
world
37
 are not overly concerned with IL. On the other hand, law finds advocates in liberal and 
neo-liberal theories,
38
 which tend to be more interested in ideas, interests and international 
organizations that enable and constrain state behavior.
39
  A third possibility for law 
internationally, taken from constructivist theories in IR, is that legal norm diffusion and the 
socializing effects of norms enable, shape and constrains state behavior.
40
 Constructivist theories 
                                                 
34
 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997). 
35
 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International 
Law and International Relations Theory A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 
(1998); R. O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 487 (1997); 
Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379 (1999). International Relations (IR) 
scholars concerned with the relations between states ask the following set of questions: Do states comply with 
treaties and international organizations because compliance saves on transaction costs associated with having to 
renegotiate treaties? Are states concerned with reputational stakes and other instrumental self-interested rational 
action? Do states merely use law to pursue their own interests (instrumental optic) or is there some causal normative 
force to law or legitimacy? Are there structural ideational and institutional legal effects, such that law constrains 
state behavior by forming the basis on which actions must be justified? 
36
 Keohane (1997); Brunnée & Toope (2012), supra; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, 
International Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); Abbott et al (2000).  
37
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics 93 (1979) (“Anarchy entails relations of coordination amon  a system's units, and that implies their 
sameness…” and in contrast to the domestic system, the international-political system contains like units (e.g. states) 
that are not differentiated by the functions they perform); HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF 
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977). 
38
 Robert Jervis, Realism in the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 971 (1998). 
39
 Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 
(1997); Lisa Martin & Beth Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT’L ORG. 
729 (1998). 
40 Brunn e & Toope (2012); Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to ‘Leglization’: Richer Views of 
Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743 (2001); Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and 
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999). The idea of the socializing effect of law is 
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claim that institutions, interests and identities are formed in relational settings that may be pre-
structured or pre-constituted in ways that make them connected and somewhat indivisible. For 
example, anarchy in the international system does not exist apart from the practices that create 
structures of identities and interests.
41
  
Constructivists challenge assumptions that interests are exogenously given and rationally 
pursued. Interests and identities are “socially constructed products of learning, knowledge, 
cultural practices and ideology.”42 To speak of state interests or state preferences in 
understandin  state behavior does not make sense without reference to “social facts” and the 
“irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action.”43 Agents and structures mutually 
constitute and it is throu h “interaction and communication [that] actors generate shared 
knowledge and shared understandings that become the background for subsequent 
interactions.”44  
The source of IL’s influence is thus ideational and interactional. Norms have a prescriptive 
force that “exert a profound impact on how people think about state roles and obli ations, and 
therefore on state behavior.” 45 But, in addition, legal norms are created, articulated and 
constructed through repeated interactions, through norm enunciation and interpretation and 
through processes of cyclicality and recursivity.
46
 The resulting institutions, such as sovereignty 
and anarchy, constitute identities which then figure in interest formation.
47
 Thus in a critical 
account of sovereignty, Antony Anghie argues that legal positivist norms which constructed a 
                                                                                                                                                             
more common in research on domestic law and falls under the general heading of Law and Society; see e.g. Susan S. 
Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 323 (2005). 
41
 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 
391, 394-395 (1992) 
42
 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996). 
43
 John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 
52 Int’l Or . 855, 856 (1998) (scholar need to acknowled e the constitutive rules to explain the ori ins of 
international relations and to rescue structure from bein  treated “as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased 
historical processes”). 
44 Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 13. 
45
 Keohane (1997), at 492; Friedrich Kratochwil, The Force of Prescriptions, 38 INT’L ORG. 685 (1984) 
46
 Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANNU. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 
263, 269 (2009) (recursivity in law includes the “rounds, or cycles, or turns, or feedback effects, or episodes” of 
legal normmaking). 
47
 Wendt (1992); Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 373. 
 -9- 
 
particular meanin  of soverei nty enabled a colonial confrontation between states and ‘non-
states’.48 For those scholars who are more hopeful about the possibility of international legal 
practices, two questions remain. First, under what conditions are legal norms going to be 
effective; under what conditions will legal rules, practices and institutions have a causal impact 
on international actors?
49
 The second, more relevant question for this project is whether there 
something particular to legal norms, something in the quality of legal that makes compliance 
with legal norms different or more effective?
50
 “[D]o legal norms, as a type, operate differently 
from any other kinds of norms in world politics?”51  
Those adhering to neo-liberal institutional IR theories tend to understand law and legal 
norms in a legal positivist, Hartian sense, where formal criteria such as secondary rules of 
recognition engender internal feelings or beliefs about being obliged.
52
 On the other hand, 
scholars more interested in constructivist theories and in the link between legal legitimacy and 
social practice have tended to see legal norms as being inherently connected to natural justice 
principles and procedures (however defined).
53
  Martha Finnemore, Stephen Toope and Jutta 
Brunn e in various articles and texts have explicitly linked feelings of obligation in IL to Fuller’s 
                                                 
48
 Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 
40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (1999); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005) 
49
 Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 380. 
50
 Keohane (1997), at 492. 
51
 Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 699, 701 (1999-2000). This has 
lead scholars to investigate the foundations of legal obli ation more  enerally. See Brunn e & Toope 2010, 6 (“the 
key to understanding the role that law plays in international society lies in understanding the nature and operation in 
practice of le al obli ation.”). Norm diffusion and international law theory has understandably proceeded in step 
with modern legal jurisprudence which moves beyond Austinian concepts of law. Law is not (merely) sovereign 
commands backed by threat of force. Rather, le al norms en ender a sense of obli ation because of law’s le itimacy 
and the respect it carries. But then the question devolves into defining legitimacy. See Hurd 1999, at 381 (At its 
most basic, le itimacy relates to the “normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ou ht to be obeyed.” This 
is a subjective, relational perception that shapes how the actor sees his or her interests); Keohane 1997, 491 
(Le itimacy relates to criteria internal to the rule and “is related to the process by which it is created, its consistency 
with accepted  eneral norms, and its perceived fairness or specificity”); and Slaughter 1997, 379 (It is the process 
throu h which law is “created, interpreted and applied” has distinctive effects on international behavior). 
52
 H L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88 (1994). 
53 Finnemore   Toope (2001); Brunn e & Toope (2010). 
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eight desiderata outlined in The Morality of Law,
54
  which are for Fuller the minimum qualities 
for a set of rules to be properly called a legal system.
55
 Brunée and Toope argue that the only 
way that legal obligation can claim to be distinctive is to the extent that the criteria are internal to 
law.
56
 Creating and applying law through processes which satisfy Fuller’s criteria of le ality 
leads to a “practice of le ality” that generates fidelity and obligation.57 Thus the distinctiveness 
for Finnemore, Toope and Brunn e stems from particular le al processes that adhere to 
principles of fairness and natural justice. Law is about process more than about form or product: 
“Much of what le itimates law and distin uishes it from other forms of normativity are the 
processes by which it is created and applied – adherence to legal process values, the ability of 
actors to participate and feel their influence, and the use of legal forms of reasoning.”58 
B. Moving away from Procedural Criteria 
These procedural approaches to legal norms raise several problems, the answers to which 
suggest possible shifts in the object of study. First, there is still the concern of pairing IR theories 
with IL. At first blush, this is a natural pairing – ‘IR’ and ‘IL’ scholars have a shared sense of the 
external environments they seek to explain and the problems that they are facin . They “see the 
same world outside their office windows”– a world of formal institutions, organizations, treaties  
but also a globalized world that is challenging both state sovereignty and relevance of formal 
state-based law.
 59
 The IR scholar’s concern about whether IL is relevant to IR has a channeling 
effect and leads to a natural focus on obligation in absence of state authority (it therefore makes 
good sense to go to analytic jurisprudence post-Austin as a source for theories about legal 
obligation beyond threat of force).  
                                                 
54
 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 
(1998); Finnemore (1999), at 705 (“Law is le itimate only to the extent that it produces rules that are  enerally 
applicable, exhibit clarity or determinacy, are coherent with other rules, are publicized (so that people know what 
they are), seek to avoid retroactivity, are relatively constant over time, are possible to perform, and are congruent 
with official action.”) 
55
 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 39 (1964). 
56 Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 12 (Formal criteria and institutional organizational factors do not provide an account 
of how legal obligation is analytically different from institutional structural obligation). 
57 Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 13. 
58
 Finnemore & Toope (2001), at 750. 
59
 Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 370. 
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However, a sole focus on International law captures only part of the activities and methods 
of law’s  lobal operation.60 Sally Engle Merry writes that “law’s internationali ation” is not 
merely a product of IL, but rather is the result of “transnational movements such as colonialism, 
contemporary transnational activism, the creation of a new world order of negotiated contracts 
and agreements linking together diverse states, the expansion of human rights activism and 
institutions, and the transplantin  of le al institutions themselves.”61 Expanding the object of 
study to include the transnational movement of domestic law and the plural global legal orders 
allows for a consideration of other effects on state power both domestically and internationally.  
For example, the global rise of judicial review both in supra-national courts
62
 and in 
constitutional courts resulting from constitutional reform in over eighty countries has affected a 
transfer of power to the judiciary and the creation of an international “juristocracy”.63 The 
movement of both public and private law legal norms (including court reforms, commercial 
codes, development of property systems) impacts on the institutional architecture of the state, 
shifting the allocation of authority between different state institutions.
64
  
The importance of looking at transnational spaces is discussed in greater depth in the next 
section. Suffice it to say here that once the IR/IL pair has been decoupled, we can return to 
Brunnée and Toope’s emphasis on reciprocity in buildin  shared understandin s and upholdin  
practices of legality. Their interactional account provides a window into thinking about law as a 
                                                 
60
 Berman (2009), at 232. 
61
 Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 99 (2006). 
62
 As of 2006, twenty-five permanent International Courts were operational; Karen Alter, The Multiple Roles of 
International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlment, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Internatinal Law and International Relations: The State of the Art 345 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds. 2013) (arguing that states have delegated four roles to judges – enforcement, 
constitutional review, administrative and dispute settlement. In their constitutional role, courts assess the legal 
validity of legislative and government actions).  
63
 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS & CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11-
12, 169-170 (2004) (adopting a realist explanation of the rise of constitutionalism and arguing that 
constitutionali ation of ri hts “is evidence that the rhetoric of ri hts and judicial review has been appropriated by 
threatened elites to bolster their own position in the polity””).  Ran Hirschl, The Realist Turn in Comparative 
Constitutional Politics, 62 POL. RES. Q. 825 (2009) (discussing realist and contextualist explanations of 
constitutional courts and judicial review); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); 
Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing As a Problematic Topic in Comparative 
(Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008) 
64
 Shaffer (2012), 245; Halliday (2009). 
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social phenomenon, about ongoing and sustained practice in legal creation and adaptation, and in 
the way legal actors collaborate to build shared understandings in law.
65
 
Unfortunately, an interactional and constructivist account of legal norms that relies on 
Fuller’s criteria of le itimacy, while intuitively pleasing, is ultimately inaccurate and misleading. 
Fuller’s principles qualify legal positivism rather than replace it.66 These “more substantive 
considerations” only work to overturn presumptions of validity and legitimacy that are conferred 
by formal criteria.
67
 More importantly, Fuller’s criteria are aspirational and idealistic, whereas 
we know that constructivism and repeated social interaction is not always an altogether happy 
affair.
68
 Constructivism as a theory posits that social interaction, communication and discourse 
construct preferences and shape identities. Ongoing interaction and processes of consideration 
and review are not necessarily linked to an ex ante quality of norms. In other words, legitimacy, 
rather than being a descriptive term, is method of appraisal undertaken ex post.
69
  
The best way to understand fundamentally what law is about is to go to our experience of 
law, grounded in everyday life and our professional formation as legal actors. This suggests that 
the procedural criteria in law-making may not represent the most important aspects of our 
“experience of law” in shaping fidelity and compliance.70  Following Sally En le Merry’s 
su  estion of “studyin  up,”71 one ought to look at how fidelity is created, at knowledge 
practices “particular points of intersection, technolo ies of legality, and sites of negotiation 
amon  multiple systems of law.” This approach of “studyin  up” fits better with a constructivist 
                                                 
65
 Finnemore & Toope (2001), at 743 (law is a social phenomenon that is embedded in “practices, beliefs and 
traditions of societies, and shaped by interaction amon  societies”). 
66
 Nico Krisch, Brunnee, Jutta, & Stephen J. Toope. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 203 (2012) (Formal claims to legitimacy are conditioned by but cannot be substituted 
with procedural requirements). Krish also correctly points out that Fuller was interested in the relationship between 
law giver and citizen, and in protecting the citizen from arbitrary and authoritative power. Where international law 
denotes the law between states it is not clear why these rule of law protections are needed. 
67
 Friedrich Kratochwil, On Legitimacy, 20 INT’L RELATIONS 302, 305 (2006). 
68
 See generally, CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth & Craig Parsons, eds. 
2010), and notwithstandin  Koh’s assertion that a constructivist approach “reco ni es the positive transformational 
effects of repeated participation in the le al process.” On the negative, unintended consequences of law, see THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: STUDIES ON LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL (Richard L. Abel ed. 1982) 
69
 Kratochwil (2006).  
70
 Kleinfeld (2009-2010) (to understand the nature of law and hence it’s distinctiveness requires a “reconstructive 
approach.”) 
71
 Merry (2006), at 108. 
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theory interested in outcomes of social interaction. The task then is to reconstruct the beliefs and 
values that make up our experiences in social practices and institutions: “we may by 
understanding its component parts be able to get some purchase on what in practice we already 
take the law to be.”72 For example, is there a way to investigate the creativity in and impulse to 
invent varieties of normative technologies
73
 as a source for law’s distinctiveness? Rather than 
investigating the aspirational descriptive qualities of legal procedural fairness, do relationships 
movements of law and legal transfers point to distinctiveness in legal technologies, in the ways 
that law operates as an instrument?  
III. LAW IN PRACTICE IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF LAW 
A. Transfer and Clashes in Transnational Legal Processes
74
 
The conflicts and possibilities in legal transplants highlight the contingency of legal orders 
and “the law-creating potential of complex, interpenetrating networks of social relationships of 
community.”75 Multiple legal products impact processes in the movement of law, transnational 
legal determinations about valid law, and the construction and transfer of legal meaning across 
geopolitical and cultural boundaries.
76
 These areas highlight the interactional nature in the 
development of legal norms, and the conflict and competition
77
 in setting agendas for articulating 
                                                 
72
 Kleinfeld (2009-2010), at 2458. 
73
 Halliday (2009), at 282. 
74
 I adopt the phrase “transnational le al processes”, aware that it conjures up both reco nition and confusion; see 
Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process (“Horizontal and Vertical Legal Process”), FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS 191 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds. 2005). Koh used the phrase “transnational le al 
process” to hi hli ht the dynamic nature of law in shapin  identities and constrainin  behavior in international 
relations. Interaction creates patterns of behavior and generates norms of external conduct. Through repeated 
processes of interaction and internationali ation law acquires its “stickiness” (at 204). Gre ory Shaffer (2012) 
defines transnational le al process as “the process throu h which the transnational construction and conveyance of 
legal norms takes place” (at 236) and ar ues that processes of articulatin , enforcin  and internali in  law do not 
unfold as uni-directionally as Koh implies. Rather the process of legal change is multidirectional and diachronic.  
75
 Cotterrell (2012), at 515. 
76
 John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L 
L. & POL. 657 (2008); Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
229 (2012). 
77
 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction 
of a Transnational Legal Order (1998). 
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legal orders in a polymorphic legal world.
78
 They account for interactions between international 
and domestic laws as well as the syncretism present in current legal thinking and practice.
79
  
My suggestion is that the construction and transnational flow of legal norms are places to 
look for clues about the distinctiveness of legal norms. In these transnational spaces, the concern 
is not the lack of a hierarchical state order to enforce legal obligations, but rather the plurality of 
options and the prospect of conflicting legal orders. Understanding transnational domains and the 
relationships between donors and recipients in the movement of law requires a similar 
decoupling of law from “hierarchically ordered imposition of social control emanatin  from a de 
facto soverei n.”80 But unlike IL, the problem is not just how to operate in a horizontal world, 
but additionally the contingency expressed in coexisting legal orders with multiple legitimacies 
and normative claims. The interactions, collisions, “iterative interplays” and resulting modes of 
norm-making may have something to tell us about the distinctiveness of law.  
Legal actors in transnational arenas include public and private actors, disaggregated-state 
officials who meet to discuss common governance functions,
81
 international development 
agencies,
82
 and professionals acting in networks, epistemic communities and in quasi legal 
institutions (WTO, ICSID, ISO).
83
 Networks of domestic judges increasingly intervene in 
                                                 
78
 Toby Goldbach, Benjamin Brake & Peter Katzenstein, The Movement of U.S. Criminal and Administrative Law: 
Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2013); Koh (1996). 
79
 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 206, at 65 (le al syncretism is evident in the “mystical union” of 
positive and natural law public law; policy analysis does le al work “with whatever materials are left over from the 
 randiose projects of the past”). 
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 Brunée & Toope (2010), at 10.  
81
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated 
Democracy, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 121, 129-131 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004); 
Anne Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System, in GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS 12, 28 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, eds. 2002). For example U.S. regulatory officials serve on 
delegations with state officials in similar regulatory positions to negotiate transnational or international treaties. See 
e.g. Stewart, supra note 115, at 78. 
82
 John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson, Taking the interpretation of legal transfers seriously: the challenge for law and 
development, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF LEGAL TRANSFERS (John Gillespie and Pip 
Nicholson eds 2012). 
83
 Haas; Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 525, 551-
552 (2010) (legal elites who studied and conducted research abroad that were the primary conveyors of foreign legal 
ideas about lay participation in the criminal trial that formed the basis for South Korea’s jury system enacted in 
2008); Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction: Lawyers, Law, and Society, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 5, at 1, 3 (Lawyers act as le al brokers “convertin  social, political 
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discussions about domestic legal reforms and court administration. Judges meet counterparts in 
other countries, with international organizations such as the Council of Europe and The World 
Bank to discuss everything from foundations in the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, client 
service and communication, to court administration management skills, records management to 
improving signs and installing help desks as a way to improve court accessibility for 
unrepresented accused, litigants and witnesses.
84
   
For example, the National Judicial Institute in Canada, which has traditional focused on 
education of local judiciary, has become increasingly involved in transnational projects in the 
Philippines, Ukraine, China and Ghana.
85
 A two-year Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) funded project called JUSTICE (Judicial Systems Improvement for Commerce 
and Economy) was implemented by the NJI “to promote economic development in the 
Caribbean, Africa, and South America by offering local judges and court authorities help in 
establishing more efficient, accessible, and dependable judicial systems.” 
Actors often have agendas in promoting the flow of legal norms. Legal norms may also 
flow “less consciously” throu h intensified cross-border economic, professional and cultural 
interactions. There are thus tensions and conflicts in the movement of legal norms.  
B. Legal Transplants 
 “Legal transplants” refers to the movement and reception of a law between states.86 The 
concept invokes the difficulties in the relationships between recipients/donors, 
diffusion/reception, and points to the mutually constitutive relationships between migratory and 
                                                                                                                                                             
and economic resources into le al processes”). Scholars and academics articulate ideas that can be translated into the 
international arena; see e.g. Catherine Weaver, The Meaning of Development, Constructing the World Bank’s Good 
Governance Agenda, in CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 47  (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010) and 
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), for a 
discussion of the infusion of “ ood  overnance” norms into discourse at the World Bank. 
84
 About Us, The International Organization for Judicial Training, http://www.iojt.org/index.html. 
85
 Ghana-Canada Judicial Cooperation Project with support from the Federal Judicial Affairs (FJA) and National 
Judicial Institute (NJI) facilitated judges from Ghana travelling to Canada on a Court Managers Training 
Programme. 
86
 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79 (1976); Ewald, at 491; William Twining, 
Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & SOC'Y 203, 211-13 (2005). 
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local law.
87
 The process of transplanting law emphasizes domestic differences, and studies have 
investigated reasons for acceptance and resistance in the movement of law, including differences 
in the types of legal transfers sometimes referred to as “or anic” versus “mechanical”,88 and 
le al families’ or le al ori in theories.89 Some of these studies have been critiqued for not 
accounting for “transplant effects” and subsequent institutional changes, for example in colonial 
territories.
90
 The point to highlight here is that legal transplants must overcome obstacles in a 
new legal system and will be affected by processes for exporting and importing legal systems, 
the characteristics that inhere in the transplanted law itself, and the ability to graft onto existing 
legal norms and practices.
91
  
The relationships between donor and recipients suggest recurring themes in transnational 
law and legal movements. In particular, legal transplants highlight the places of competition, 
power and politics in the relationships between legal donors and legal recipients. Yves Dezalay 
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 Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of 
Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 781 (2009); John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis 
of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657, 685 (2008); and Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165 (2003). 
88
 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (1974). 
89
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (LLSV) in a series of papers 
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Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 
1131, 1149 (1997); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 
Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 
Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). For a review of country studies and the legal origin 
effects on particular areas of law, see generally La Porta, supra note 7, at 292-93. See also Mirjan Damaška, The 
Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 
(1997) (examining two families of civil procedure); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal 
Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813 (2009) (examining corporate and securities 
laws empirically to find diffusion of materials from core countries to periphery countries). 
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 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the 
Transplant Effect, 47 Eur. Econ. Rev. 165, 166 (2003); Daniels, Trebilcock & Carson (2011), at 126; Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law's Relationship to the Economy-Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 831 (2009). 
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 Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants,’ 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111 (1997); Sally 
Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice 134-78 (2006); 
Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, at 167. 
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and Bryant Garth have been involved in multiple research projects lookin  into “competitive 
processes” implicated in the movement of law, in particular in “creatin  and maintainin  a 
demand for transnational norms.”92 They find that Judges, multinational firms, and business 
litigators have worked to promote a U.S. style litigation approach as the standard for 
international commercial arbitration.
93
 Similarly, Halliday notes the politics and power shifts 
between the market and the state even in highly technical regulatory reforms such as corporate 
bankruptcy law reform.
94
  ountries in the “Global South” received national corporate 
bankruptcy transplants induced by persuasion, material benefits and on occasion “economic 
coercion”. International financial institutions (IFIs) use financial bailouts to induce states to 
accept legal transplants that included legal regimes for market regulation and increased functions 
for courts in managing reorganization and liquidation, for example through the establishment of 
a new Commercial Court in Indonesia. These reforms exceed technical reforms and achieve a 
“restructurin  of the state itself” through injection of courts and reshuffling functions and power 
among state institutions. 
The influence of the United States as a donor of legal forms and procedures has been 
examined in a pair of articles by Peter Katzenstein and Benjamin Brake. The first examines the 
spread of private law procedures, specifically class action and discovery procedures.
95
 In the 
second article, Goldbach, Brake and Katzenstein evaluate the movement of U.S. public law, 
                                                 
92
 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and Selling Transnational ‘Judges’ and Global ‘Experts’: Building 
the Credibility of (Quasi) Judicial Regulation, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 113, 114 (2010); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. 
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93
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 Terence C. Halliday, Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction of States 
in East Asia, 37 Law and Soc. Inq. 265 (2012) 
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 Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, Lost in Translation? Non-State Actors and the Transnational Movement 
of Procedural Law, 67 Int’l Or . 4 (forthcomin  October 2013) (while the movement of U.S. law has reshaped le al 
theory, pedagogy, procedure, and organizing structures of the le al profession, nevertheless, “Americani ation” 
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specifically criminal and administrative legal procedures.
96
 Legal transplants of U.S. legal 
procedures stand as an example of both U.S. power to export legal models, but also the 
competition the U.S. faces in competing with other models and in on the ground translation.
97
 
The movement of law across borders is situated in a world of material, social and intellectual 
power which affects states’ ability to shape discourse about legal norms and make certain legal 
norms available for transplant. However, legal transplants also point to choice of form, and 
processes of translation, resistance and modification. Legal ideologies influence processes of 
transplanting laws and often shape donor decisions on how to frame or package legal transplants. 
The result of the movement of legal norms is often syncretic and polymorphic. 
C. Choice and the “Compliance-Pull” of Reform 
The transnational movement of U.S. style jury systems, in particular, is significant for what 
legal transplants have to tell us about the distinctiveness of legal norms.
98
 Lay participation in the 
criminal trial has seen a “rebirth”. Legal transplants of jury systems to post-authoritarian 
countries has been channeled through socialization of foreign legal scholars from at U.S. law 
schools,
99
 as well as at conferences,
100
 or through collaborative research networks. At least fifty-
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 Richard O. Lempert, The Internationalization of Lay Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 480 (2007) (noting the spread of juries to the post-authoritarian countries of Japan, Korea, 
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four countries use jury trials, including Russia and Spain, which recently reintroduced jury 
trials.
101
 Several post-Soviet countries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Azerbaijan 
enshrined a right to trial by jury in their constitutions.
102
 Georgia, which enacted legislation 
enabling jury trials in 2009, modeled its jury system on U.S. juries and held its first criminal jury 
trial in 2011.
103
  
Court reforms of East Asian legal systems in the last decade exemplify the presence and 
limits of power politics, but also highlight the latitude some recipients have in choosing from 
various legal models. These point to the possibility that legal actors build fidelity and feelings of 
obligation other than through adherence to procedural quality criteria. East Asian transplants of 
jury and lay participation systems have been subjected to processes of showcasing, selection, and 
translation. The resulting systems are syncretic and polymorphic, yet they receive a wide range 
of support from both legal elites and members of the public.  
Japan engaged in a process of investigating various models before instituting the Saiban-in 
Seido.
104
 A sub-committee of the Osaka Bar Association's Committee for Judicial System 
Reform toured the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, and several judges of the Supreme 
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 See Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Citizens as Legal Decision Makers: An International Perspective, 40 
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(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402877_text. Georgia contracted the U.S. 
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Court of Japan travelled to the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France 
investigating potential lay participation transplants.
105
 Japan had a jury system from 1928 to 
1943. And while Japan moved from a dossier-based trial to oral presentations in the recent 
reforms, the resulting system includes more features reflective of a mixed judge/lay person
106
 
model familiar to civil law jurisdictions.
107
 In serious criminal cases, six lay judges and three 
professional judges decide questions of guilt and sentencing in criminal felony cases based on a 
majority vote by the panel, where at least one citizen and one professional is in the majority.
108
  
South Korea, often receptive to ideas and practices stemming from the United States,
109
 
transplanted a version of U.S. jury system, translating features from both U.S. and German lay 
participation models. Korean jurors deliberate separately from the judge, and prosecution and 
defense have a limited number (five) of peremptory challenges but an unlimited number of 
challenges for cause. In addition, South Korea incorporated  alifornia’s rules on juror note-
taking and questioning witnesses.
110
 The system differs, however, from the U.S. jury system in 
the following respects: juries are composed of five, seven, or nine jurors in proportion to the 
seriousness of a crime; where jurors cannot reach a unanimous decision on the verdict, they can 
consult the presiding judge and then suggest a verdict based on a majority vote; and finally, the 
jury is advisory, present recommendations which the judge can accept or reject.
111
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In a surprising, recent development in support of the shadow jury system, the Supreme 
Court of South Korea ruled in two decisions that, where a criminal case is tried by a jury and the 
jury returns a unanimous verdict of not-guilty, an appellate court cannot reverse a lower court 
jud e’s not-guilty verdict unless there is clear and convincing reason following a new 
investigation of the evidence.
112
 This increase status and influence of the new jury transplant 
supports Korea’s aspirational  oals of citi en participation in decision makin , and points to 
normative conceptual  oals of the le al transplants. However, there’s also a sociolo ical story, 
about processes of investigating and implementing transplants that might be relevant to 
understanding compliance pull.  
Plans for the introduction of a jury system were discussed in 1999 under the auspicious of 
the Judicial Reform Steering Committee, organized by the Supreme Court of Korea. On October 
28, 2003 a Judicial Reform Committee [Sabeopgaehyeok wiwonhoe] was created and on 
December 15, 2004, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform [Sabeopjedogaehyeok 
chujinwiwonhoe] was established to implement the recommendations. A plan for civil 
participation was drafted in 2005, discussed by the National assembly in 2006, and an Act was 
passed the followin  year. The Supreme  ourt also established a “Judicial Participation Plannin  
Board” to conduct mock jury trials, videotape and analy e real jury trials, and run educational 
sessions for the legal practitioners.  
Existing research about compliance can be expanded by examining the process of 
participating in legal reform and justice projects, as well as the allure or aesthetics of interacting 
with law as an instrument.
113
  In other words, research might examine whether a connection to 
law’s promise of reform and development may also contribute to compliance and feelin s of 
fidelity. For example, Annelise Riles finds that human rights lawyers remain engaged and 
embedded in their projects despite strong and widespread skepticism about the human rights 
re ime’s ability to deliver. 114 Similarly, despite declarations that the law and development 
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project of the 1980s was a failure,
115
 law and development and rule of law programs persist and 
are now enterin  their ‘third’ incarnation.116   
Studies report positive associations following participation in legal institutions, highlighting 
the connection between interaction and feelings of fidelity. For example jurors report higher 
regard for courts, judges and the jury system following their trial experiences (Diamond, 1993). 
In a U.S. national survey of over 8,000 former jurors, sixty-three percent reported that they were 
more favorable about jury duty after serving. More than eighty-five percent of Croatian lay 
judges had positive opinions about their participation. Moreover, lay judges believe they have a 
substantial and beneficial impact on verdicts,
117
 despite studies which show that, even with 
formal voting requirements, lay judges agree with and are likely to modify their opinion to 
resolve disa reements with professional jud es (Kutnjak Ivković, 2007). Surveys of jurors in 
South Korea’s new advisory jury system show similar positive views of their experience (Park, 
2010), and in a study of Japanese citizen participation, ninety-four percent of the lay judge 
respondents reported having a positive experience. Research design may be more complicated in 
international settings, nevertheless these studies point to interesting ways to think about the 
influence of legal participation.   
IV. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND INDETERMINATE LEGAL ORDERS 
A. Power and Politics 
Dispute processing and social regulation occur in multiple locations, in institutions and 
organizations that draw on the symbols of law.
118
 Both formal and informal methods are being 
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used to transnationally regulate the environment, security, health, immigration, and labor.
119
 
Private and public
120
 actors govern through a variety of mechanisms that include domestic 
administrative agencies and regimes structured by treaties or similar types of agreements.
121
 
Multiple overlapping jurisdictions subsist in laws, treaties, or other legal structures that 
coordinate and facilitate cross border activity, and in judicial decisions that extend the territorial 
application of regulations.
122
 And several international organizations and transnational 
institutions intercede into state oversight through judicial review jurisdictions.
123
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International and transnational communities create and give meaning to legal norms 
throu h law’s “juris enerative power”, which allows for norm articulation in “multiple 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions.”124 The collisions125 (Teubner), tensions and conflicts that 
multiple legal orders and jurisdictional redundancies present suggest another important feature of 
legal norms. The possibility of multiple as well as indeterminate legal orders, the relationships 
between overlapping jurisdictional claims, and practices of constituting and recognizing legal 
orders point to particular ways that law ensures fidelity.  
Overlapping jurisdictions and indeterminate orders facilitate a particular kind of stability 
and creative possibility. Berman refers to “dialectical dances” notin  that “dialectical and 
iterative interplays” will happen more often “as a variety of communities claim an interest in 
regulating distant behavior having extraterritorial effects or as parties claim a community 
affiliation beyond the local.”126 Research into legal norms distinctiveness should examine the 
ways that the contests over legal norms create legitimacy over time. A brief survey of legal 
pluralist orders suggests that recognition not as a rule but as a practice features in the 
construction and stability of legal norms. 
Legal pluralism was initially tied to an anthropolo ical interest in ‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ 
methods of social control and investigated parallel autonomous legal orders often in colonial or 
post-colonial jurisdictions. Following on critiques of the way anthropology exoticized and 
othered its research subjects, scholarship about legal pluralism delved into uncovering the ways 
that colonial administrators constructed ‘traditional’ le al systems as a method of orderin  and 
regulating indigenous populations.
127
 Scholars uncovered the ways that elites codified and reified 
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‘traditional’ indi enous practices for administrative or control purposes. “The creation of 
colonial law was neither an innocuous nor a nonviolent act: For the colonizers, it created an 
order that was categorically similar and thus could be subjected to their own law; for the elites 
among the colonized, it opened up avenues toward reaffirming their own power.”128  
In addition to highlighting ways that power was implicated in both legal and scholarly 
projects, legal pluralism became wrapped up in debates about cultural relativism versus the quest 
for a universal normative international legal order.
129
 Legal pluralism in this context represented 
tolerance and acceptance, but it also advanced a poignant challenge to the le al order’s stability 
by brin in  into clear view law’s contin ency. 
Scholarship into legal pluralism has shifted from studying informal disputing to examine 
the ordering or regulation in non-state situations.
130
 Scholars focus on the interconnectedness of 
social orders and the way that state law penetrates and restructures other normative orders. Legal 
pluralism focuses on “conceptuali in  a more complex and interactive relationship between 
official and unofficial forms of orderin ” to see the ‘unofficial’ forms as part of a plural legal 
order.”131 Law is no lon er the “exclusive artifact” of the nation state, but rather is produced by a 
diverse set of groups and communities that operate globally to structure and regulate behavior. 
Various sectors of society, including multinational enterprises, labor, human rights and the 
internet, are “breakin  the narrow frame of national law” and developin  a  lobal law in 
isolation from the state.
132
  
Le al pluralism’s second wave finds connections with narratives about  lobali ation, 
transnational private regulation and non-state governance. Most recently, Sally Merry joined 
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Benedict Kingsburry – who is deeply involved in the Global Administrative Law (GAL) project 
– and others at NYU on a project examinin  the use of “indicators” as a technique of  lobal 
governance.
133
 The research agenda melds together issues in legal pluralism, international 
political economy and techniques of control. As legal pluralism enters into the neoliberal arena, 
there is now a  rowin  sense that ‘le al’ and ‘non-le al’ forms of social re ulation “have always 
been part of the central make-up of le al theory.”134 A plurality of legal orders and a place for 
non-state norms is now ‘common sense’. Legal pluralism “is no more a reality than legal 
centralism, but rather is merely another (though potentially superior) representation of legal 
reality.”135  
In addition to examples of multiple overlapping jurisdictions, law offers several examples 
of stable yet indeterminate legal regimes. The international human rights regime does not 
indicate whether legal procedures by which defendants are to be tried ought to resemble 
common-law, civil-law or mixed procedures.
136
 For example, the various human rights treaties 
make no guarantees for the right to a trial by jury, nor do they establish firm guidelines 
concerning the admissibility of evidence or the role of the adjudicator. The final agreement on 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court (ICC) grants individual 
adjudicators a considerable amount of discretion in choosing applicable procedures. In order to 
secure support of the maximum number of member states, the final agreement avoids choosing a 
particular tradition. Similarly, the Latvian public law reforms, rather than imposing a uniform 
procedure, provided guidelines for agency decisions and allowed each agency to adopt 
procedures as it sees fit.
137
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B. Recognition as Mode of Norm-Making 
Current approaches to understanding legal pluralism move beyond the dichotomy between 
monist and pluralist concepts of law to emphasize that law is uniform and plural at the same time 
(Michaels). In his discussion of a potential third paradigm for global legal pluralism, Ralf 
Michaels interestingly proposes that law has this propensity toward order and coherence even in 
the face of the blatant contingency that legal pluralism presents. Borrowing from systems theory 
about recursivity and stability, Michaels argues that legal pluralism’s new direction would 
inquire into the ways that multiple orders create stability and mutual reinforcement:  
Legal pluralism suggests a third dimension – how legal systems create, through recognition, 
other legal systems, and how the mutual recognition among legal systems in turn creates 
stability (or the illusion of it). Legal pluralism allows for a relativism of position. This is 
not the simple normative relativism (the recognition that norms may differ and the call for 
tolerance)… Instead, it is an epistemic relativism in which law is constructed – not only by 
communities for themselves, but especially by legal systems for each other.
138
  
 
Michaels advocates adopting the concept of recognition as “a practice of the reco ni in  
law” rather than understandin  it as a rule or formal criterion for validity. “Reco nition, as a 
juridical cate ory, is thus analy ed as a practice, an anthropolo ical cate ory…” Similarly, 
David Kennedy suggests using legal pluralism as a method to uncover the gaps and biases, and 
the effects of “the rule of experts” and “their routine work” which denies them “the experience of 
discretion and responsibility and the rest of us the opportunity to challen e their action.”139  
Shifting the focus to recognition as a practice opens up spaces to bring legal pluralism back 
to the ‘le al centre’, back to the state and courts, not as instantiation of a monist le al order, but 
rather as a site for investigating multiple practices. A focus on recognition also allows for an 
examination of the ways that domestic state courts now exhibit core themes of legal pluralism – 
the “irreducible plurality of le al orders in the world, the coexistence of domestic state law with 
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other legal orders, the absence of a hierarchically superior position transcending the 
differences.”140  
Recognition as practice allows for an exploration into the boundaries of law by 
investigating interactions between and effects of multiple legal orders in addition to proving that 
multiple orders exist. Overlapping jurisdictional claims and indeterminate legal orders in global 
regulation suggest another important feature of legal norm-making. In these competitive and 
contingent legal spaces, legal actors and legal orders in a sense collaborate to mutually recognize 
and stabilize multiple coexisting legal systems.  
V. CONCLUSION: LEGAL DISTINCTIVENESS?  
The paper proposes that transnational legal processes and their modes of collaborative 
norm-making may be additional sites to learn about the ways that law achieves its ‘stickiness.’ 
The relationships between donors and recipients of legal transplants suggest that in competitive 
and power infused legal spaces, syncretism and practices of translation are ways that legal actors 
collaborate to integrate legal norms. The persistence of indeterminate legal orders and the 
interactions between overlapping jurisdictional claims indicates that recognition as a practice 
may be another mode of collaborative norm-making which stabilizes legal norms.  
But what does this have to tell us about the distinctiveness of legal norms?
141
 Following on 
Merry’s su  estion to “study up”, the paper concludes with some preliminary thou hts on 
knowledge practices in law and what the modes of collaborative norm-making in transnational 
le al processes have tell us about law’s distinctiveness.  
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A. Attachment to Instrumentalism 
Rudolf von Jherin  remarked that transplantin  le al institutions is a matter “of usefulness 
and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, 
[and] only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his back garden.142” The 
first knowledge practice to consider is the attraction or fascination – among academics and legal 
practitioners – with law reform, legal change and legal instrumentalism. The fascination with law 
reform presents not merely in changing law that reflects changing circumstances (e.g. climate 
change) or changing attitudes (e.g. same-sex marriage), but also in the new legal ways that we 
posit to solve (old) problems. Despite the “failure” of the welfare state, the failure of law and 
development, the critique of judges and the courts, legal actors maintain a vision of law “as a set 
of problem-solvin  institutions and of le al techniques”. To think like a lawyer, writes Riles, “is 
to think of law as a tool or a means to an end, whether one imagines law as a tool of social 
justice or a tool of corporate interests.”143  
Instrumentalism in legal transplants is solidly entrenched in a broader history of legal 
thinking, particularly in the United States, which has come to see law as a tool.
144
 Law is a 
“social instrument,” where the social reality is malleable and can be altered “by humans for 
human purposes in the course of solvin  problems.”145 It is a technology that lawmakers – as 
social engineers – employ to achieve external sociological goals. Law is a means to serve social 
ends even if different people disa ree about the “ri ht  oals” to pursue or the “ri ht ways” to 
pursue them. 
With respect to IL, Kleinfeld writes that law acts as a bridge between the hypothetical and 
the actual, it “stands in a special relationship to consequences in the world” in a way that most 
forms of discourse do not. Law has real world consequences, “brin in  them to pass in virtue of 
imperatives suffused with a certain sort of power.”  Does this sense of obli ation and 
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commitment to problem solving, the creativity in and impulse to invent varieties of normative 
technologies
146
 stand as a source for law’s distinctiveness?  
B. Contingency and Expectations 
A second way to think about knowledge practices in law is to examine the curious way that 
legal norms are able to function in indeterminate and multiple legal orders. Both Michaels and 
Berman suggest that multiple jurisdictional claims generate greater possibilities for creativity 
and stability in legal norm-making. For their thinking about global legal pluralism, Michaels and 
Gunther Teubner clearly borrow from sociological systems theory.
147
 I conclude with a closer 
look at those claims and what they add to thinkin  about le al norms’ distinctiveness.  
Niklas Luhmann engaged in several sociological accounts of systems theory in law.
148
 In A 
Sociological Theory of Law, Luhmann investigates the particular ways that legal norms manage 
and coordinate expectations.
149
 He argues that the distinction scholars make between the 
normative and the factual should be replaced with a distinction between normative and cognitive 
expectations and their place in the handling of disappointment. Cognitive expectations are those 
that can be changed in the face of contradicting information, whereas we do not reject normative 
expectations even if someone acts against them.
 150
 Normative expectations “si nify the 
determination not to learn from disappointments.”151  
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Norms are thus ‘counterfactually stabilised behavioural expectations’ and they have 
unconditional validity independent of actual fulfillment or non-fulfillment.
152
 In other words, the 
fact of whether the expectation is met or not met is not relevant. Stable normative expectations 
do not guarantee a particular future, but rather manage the unpredictability of the future, 
allowing for stability in the face of discrepant events.
153
 Legal norms supervise this process, by 
creating counterfactual, disappointment-prepared and normative expectations.
154
  
Law provides ‘security’ in protectin  expectations and “immunizing” society against a 
necessary risk.  Law does this not only by positing a general statement of expectations that do 
not have to be adjusted, but also by justifying conduct retrospectively and then, for example in 
adjudication, by determining which party will need to adjust expectations (changing seemingly 
normative expectations to cognitive expectations). Legal systems provide structures that are both 
formally operational and that are able to track and record “patterns of hope, experience and 
decisions.”155 My sense is that legal norms are distinctive in their particular ability to combine 
past and present, practical and normative, skepticism and hope.  
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